

Monograph Series 31

Exploring Unofficial Japan-Taiwan Security Policy
Coordination After The New Guidelines For
Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

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ISBN978-4-944181-23-0

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Foreword

Facing the rapidly growing potential military threat of the People's Republic of China (henceforth, China), Japan and the Republic of China on Taiwan (henceforth, Taiwan) are thoroughly barred from forming official inter-state collaboration, cooperation, and coordination in security policy due to the lack of state recognition and diplomatic relations. So circumscribed under international law, however, it is still allowable for them to take unilateral action aimed at unofficially coordinating their security policies, including military operations and other activities. Such unofficial coordination is more necessary now than ever, given the new Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation that implicitly yet undoubtedly assumes both East China Sea and Taiwan Strait contingencies, each of which might occur independently or concurrently. This study will formulate a specific policy package for the coordination.

With China's blatant political and military pressures, President Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) has to immediately strive to strengthen relations with the U.S. Taiwan's sole security guarantor. In fact, this involves building good security ties with Japan, given that U.S. military power is most effective when exercised through the Japan-U.S. alliance.

In April 2016, Frank Hsieh (謝長廷), who was the premier in former president Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) administration, said in unprecedented pre-appointment interviews with Japanese newspapers that Tsai selected him to be Taiwan's next representative to Japan, with a mission to build a bilateral strategic partnership. Also, an exceptionally large non-partisan league for strengthening Japan-Taiwan relations was formed in early May 2016 with 104 out of 113 Legislative Yuan members.

Yet it remains to be seen whether these moves can lead to success. In 2005, the Chen administration established the Committee on Japanese Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in addition to the Association of East Asia Relations, Taiwan's non-governmental agency to handle practical relations with Japan. In 2006, the then-ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) sent a high-level delegation to Tokyo, followed by a similar

one of the leading opposition Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). In 2011, then-president Ma Ying-jeou's (馬英九) administration set up the Board on Taiwan-Japan Relations at the Presidential Office. These were swings and misses.

Japan-Taiwan relations have improved significantly over the past decade, centered on commercial, cultural, tourist and other non-governmental relations. Notably, the ties have been enhanced through several exchanges of relief donations after great earthquakes and floods, despite intermittent anti-Japanese hiccups stemming from Chinese nationalism as related to history, territorial, and/or fishery issues, but the ties totally lack security/military components.

This is in marked contrast to ties with the U.S. that today include a set of informal policy talks covering strategic and defense issues. This so-called Monterey Talks process has greatly facilitated Taiwan's defense reform and modernization both in hardware and software aspects of military affairs. Consequently, Taiwan's armed forces now have a higher level of jointness among themselves and interoperability with their U.S. counterparts and, potentially, major U.S. allies', while continuous improvement is under way.

The difference between the Japan's and the U.S. cases results from their dissimilar government structures that impose differing constraints on their respective Taiwan policies. Japan has an executive-dominated government involving wide administrative discretion in dealing with foreign affairs, while the U.S. has law-dominated government requiring clear legal authorization.

Japan has no security commitments to Taiwan, though the U.S. has strong ones. Also, Japan sees no possibility of confrontation between the executive and legislative branches of government given a cabinet system in which the prime minister is the leader of a majority party of the Japanese Diet. On the other hand, the U.S. separation of powers involves a good possibility of confrontation between the two branches, particularly because the U.S. Congress opposed U.S. derecognition of Taiwan, concurrent with the recognition of China.

More importantly, the difference originates from the absence and

presence of legal interest in defense of Taiwan. Japan has no legal interest whatsoever given that it renounced sovereignty of Taiwan under the San Francisco Peace Treaty and that it does not recognize Taiwan as a de jure state. On the other hand, the U.S. entered the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan in 1954. With the treaty abrogated in 1979, the U.S. instead enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) as a domestic legal instrument.

Thus, Japan strictly avoids direct inter-state interaction, adhering to the non-governmental framework. This means that, as an official position, Japan's defense policymakers and military leaders must not have official policy talks and exchanges with Taiwan's counterparts.

On the other hand, the U.S. approach is potentially flexible due to the entrenched country's separation of powers, involving the check and balance in foreign policy between the executive and legislative branches as well as between the executive and the judiciary branches. This is well demonstrated by the legislative process and circumstances of the TRA. Moreover, there is sufficient room to maneuver in bilateral defense talks and exchanges unless they form inter-state relations. The TRA gives limited statutory authorization for arms sales to Taiwan that entails the related official information gathering and contacts of U.S. defense policymakers and military personnel with Taiwan's counterparts.

Hence, informal Japan-Taiwan defense interaction has to be pursued through low-profile, non-governmental, unofficial and informal contacts and channels.

From a Japanese perspective, much ado about Taiwan's "Japan shift" appears to be that its political leaders are playing to the gallery, given overwhelmingly pro-Japanese sentiments. Or it reflects the dearth of in-depth expertise of Japan's political system and policymaking in Taiwan's policy and academic community. Perhaps the reality is driven by the interplay of both factors.

How can Taiwan under Tsai avoid this pitfall? How can Japan handle its informal relations with Taiwan, aiming at unofficial Japan-Taiwan security policy coordination? This study will propose a policy package for this objective, including a roadmap involving crucial stage-by-stage benchmarks

for sequential execution.

To conduct this study, this author was affiliated for three months as a ROC-MOFA Taiwan Fellow with the MacArthur Center for Security Studies at the National Chengchi University Institute of International Relations. This work is also a result of the Collaborative Research Project, entitled as “Japan’s Security in the 21 st Century (IV)”, under the auspices of St. Andrew’s University (Momoyama Gakuin Daigaku) Research Institute.

Contents

1. Common Strategic Interests: the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan	
1) Taiwan's strategic value for the U.S. and Japan	6
2) The Japan-U.S. alliance and U.S. semi-alliance with Taiwan	8
3) The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation of 1978, 1997, and 2015	11
2. Post-2015 Guidelines Agenda for Taiwan	
1) U.S. peacetime operational needs in Taiwan's theater and their implications to peacetime Japan	17
2) U.S. wartime operational needs in a Taiwan contingency and their implications to peacetime Japan	22
3) Japan's wartime operational needs in Taiwan's theater and its implications to the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S. semi-alliance with Taiwan	26
3. Unofficial Bilateral Relations and Constraints	
1) Japan	29
2) The U.S.	31
3) Similarities and differences	32
4. U.S.-Taiwan Institutional Innovation: the Monterey and Other Talks	
1) U.S. and Taiwan's motives and agenda	35
2) The evolution of functional development	39
3) Achievements, limits, and future agenda	44
5. Proposing an Informal Mechanism for Japan-Taiwan Unofficial Defense Talks	
1) Constraints and obstacles	47
2) Devising an informal bilateral approach to evade possible obstruction and sabotage	52
3) Developing a policy package for sequential execution	56
Selected Bibliography	59

1 . Common Strategic Interests: the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan

1) Taiwan's strategic value for the U.S. and Japan

In contemporary international relations, Taiwan has vital strategic importance to Japan's national security. Given the island's location on Japan's major south-bound sea-lanes of communication, it is not simply acceptable for Japan to allow China to take control of them. Thus, Japan needs to secure the freedom of navigation on both sides of Taiwan, not necessarily the *de jure* independence of a Republic of Taiwan. Also, Taiwan is Japan's fourth largest trading partner, after China, the United States, and South Korea. Therefore, Taiwan's continued prosperity as a democracy and a free-market economy is indispensable to Japan's economic and commercial interests. Thus, *ceteris paribus*, an independent Taiwan is in Japan's best interests.

Similarly, the U.S. has significantly stronger interests in seeing a democratic and prosperous Taiwan, which is essential for Japan's south-bound sea-lanes and its prosperity. Based on bilateral alliance with Japan, the U.S. has secured its military bases and facilities located on the soil of the ally as pivotal footholds of logistical support, forward deployment and power projection to the Far East and beyond the region. Besides, Japan as ally is a crucial U.S. strategic asset due to its techno-economic resourcefulness as well as compact but technologically sophisticated Self-Defense Forces that can supplement and complement U.S. military power. Thus the U.S. cannot afford to put Japan in the hands of China.

More importantly, Taiwan's strategic value is deeply entrenched in a geostrategic context. Taiwan as well as the Korean Peninsula can serve as Japan's buffer vis-à-vis a dominant Eurasian land power, which can be put in the context of its global competition with a global sea power. Taiwan is on frontline in such a great game. This is because Japan can serve as a buffer between the two and as one's bridgehead and buffer against the other. Due to the serious lack of strategic depth inherent in its long and

narrow archipelago located offshore the Eurasian landmass, Japan remains helplessly vulnerable without a stable buttress of either one of the two. Thus it has to choose a side for survival, while operation on two fronts is suicidal.

Evidently, it is Japan's strategic imperative to be sided with a global sea power. This is because that these two sea powers share the strong sense of domestic and international order in favor of decentralization vis-à-vis a despotic Eurasian land power that favors centralization. The choice makes sense particularly because historic Japan developed a longtime state identity detached from and untouched by the Sino-centric order.

In the global geostrategic game, therefore, Japan simply has a supplementary and complementary role vis-à-vis a global sea power. This effectively means that, under the Anglo-American dominance, Japan has to advance toward the Eurasian land mass. Japan prospers if and only if it adheres to this geostrategic imperative and successfully manages the strategic constraints thereunder.

Today's Japan geostrategic standing is sufficiently solid because it is firmly tied up with the U.S. hegemon, the only global sea power, through bilateral alliance, while Russia's power is on the wane over mid- and long-terms. There is little need for Japan to march northward, while still necessary to pay due caution on Russia. Yet, with China's rapid rising and U.S. relative decline, there is some uncertainty on U.S. willingness to unilaterally shoulder security burdens vis-à-vis China, particularly because the U.S. economy suffers serious structural problems consequent upon the financial crisis of fall 2008 after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. China's threat will likely grow over a mid-term, even though it faces rapid greying, and be compounded by rapidly aggravating internal social-economic contradictions, disguised-nationalistic appeal to socialism, and uncertain civilian control of the military. Japan has to supplement and complement U.S. military power in the East Asia and the Western Pacific.

Taiwan's freedom of action is very limited. It is an object, not a subject of regional strategic relations. It is a mini-Japan in the geostrategic sense, as it is an outer part of the Japan-centered Northeast Asian buffer/bridgehead

of the sole U.S. global sea power. Evidently, Taiwan must follow U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy and need strategic as well as operational and tactical coordination with the U.S. Also, Taiwan must coordinate its defense policy with Japan at operational and tactical levels in the context of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

2) The Japan-U.S. alliance and U.S. semi-alliance with Taiwan

As of today, East Asia lacks a U.S.-led multilateral alliance comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), instead equipped only with a U.S. led hub-and-spokes system involving U.S. bilateral alliances with Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and two Southeast Asian Major Non-NATO Allies (MNNA) — the Philippines and Thailand. The system once formally included the Republic of China (Taiwan) until the mutual security treaty was abrogated in 1979 as a result of mutual state derecognition.

Without a formal inter-state relationship with Taiwan, therefore, the U.S. and Japan cannot form a virtual trilateral alliance that includes the country. This is in sharp contrast to the case of the U.S., Japan, and the ROK, that is grounded on two U.S. bilateral security treaties, devoid of a formal Japan-ROK security treaty as the third leg, in which the U.S. plays the hub role. While the latter often becomes dysfunctional due to Seoul's non-strategic/political animosity against Japan, the former cannot simply materialize itself even with strong willingness between Japan and Taiwan.

More specifically, the U.S. and Japan have institutionalized a multi-layered alliance management mechanism in accordance to the bilateral security treaty, from strategic to operational to tactical levels. The Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) is the highest-level organ consisting of Japan's Foreign and Defense Ministers and U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense. Under the SCC, there is the non-regular highest working-level Security Subcommittee (SSC) comprised of Japan's Administrative Vice-Ministers and/or Vice-Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense and/or a major director general of bureau of the two ministries, as well as their U.S. counterparts. The SCC has the standing Subcommittee

for Defense Cooperation (SDC) composed of, on the Japanese side, Foreign Ministry's Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau, Defense Ministry's Directors-Generals of Bureaus of Defense Policy and of Local Cooperation, and Chief of Joint Staff, and, on the U.S. side, Assistant Secretaries of State and Defense and representatives of the U.S. embassy in Japan, the Headquarters of the U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Pacific Command. The subordinate Security Consultative Group (SCG) manages tactical-level coordination, which includes, on the Japanese side, Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau, Director-General of Bureau of Policy Bureau, and Chief of Joint Staff and, on the U.S. side, Minister and Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Japan, USFJ Commander, and its Chief of Staff. Also, there is the biweekly-held Japan-U.S. Joint Committee in accordance with bilateral Status-of-Force Agreement, which includes, on the Japanese side, Director-General of the North American Affairs Bureau and Director-General of Bureau of Local Cooperation and, on the U.S. side, Minister of the U.S. Embassy in Japan and USFJ Chief of Staff.¹⁾

In contrast to the U.S.-Japan alliance that requires close coordination between their two national commands, the U.S.-ROK alliance is under a combined command that enables integrated planning and implementation, with the ROK operational control in peacetime and under the U.S. control in wartime.²⁾ The U.S. and the ROK take care of political and strategic issues through the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) that includes U.S. Defense Secretary, ROK Minister of National Defense, and their senior defense and foreign affairs officials; and operational issues through the Military Committee Meeting (MCM) that is co-chaired by U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and ROK Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,³⁾ and tactical issues by subordinate organs. Thus, U.S.-Japan-ROK

1) 「安全保障問題に関する日米両国政府の関係者間の主な協議の場」 http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1999/zuhyo/frame/az114010.htm, accessed on April 18, 2016.

2) “Mission of the ROK/US Combined Force Command,” <http://www.usfk.mil/About/CombinedForcesCommand.aspx>, accessed on April 16, 2016.

3) “Joint Communiqué: The 46th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting,” October

coordination can proceed well when U.S. leadership concurs with Japan and ROK followership.

On the other hand, U.S. and Japan's relationships with Taiwan are neither based on mutual security treaty nor on any international legal instrument, therefore, without any formal inter-state coordination mechanisms comparable to those between and among the U.S., Japan, and the ROK. Yet, the U.S. is Taiwan's sole de facto security guarantor, because it unilaterally relates itself with Taiwan through the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), a domestic legal instrument. The TRA does not stipulate any explicit defense obligation to Taiwan, but can be interpreted to require U.S. military intervention if the PRC attacks or invades Taiwan. This is clear given the requirement "to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan." The TRA also requires that "the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability." There is significant ambiguity over U.S. commitment to arms exports because the TRA stipulates "the nature and quantity" of the arms exports will be determined solely by the judgment of President and the Congress.

The state of affairs long posed little serious concern about the defense of Taiwan, because U.S. military power was preponderant during and beyond the Cold War, prior to China's rapid and significant rise involving U.S. relative decline. Also, there was little risk that Taiwan would declare de jure independence, until pro-independence forces would become dominant in the domestic politics. Given recent unfavorable regional developments, Taiwan now has to be organically connected, if not integrated, with the U.S. hub-and-spokes system centered on the Japan-U.S. alliance.

23, 2014, http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/46th_SCM_Joint_Communique.pdf, accessed on April 18, 2016.

3) The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation of 1978, 1997, and 2015

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, is an outlier case among U.S. bilateral mutual security treaties with its major allies, because it lacks genuine mutual defense obligation; the U.S. is required to defend Japan when armed attack occurs against Japan, but Japan is not obligated to defend the U.S., if attack against it occurs outside the territories administered by Japan. Instead, Japan only has to provide the U.S. with military bases and facilities on its soil for the maintenance of peace and security of Far East as well as of Japan. The essential feature of the treaty is a real estate rental contract in exchange of security guarantee. The asymmetry is a legacy of Japan's crushing defeat in the Second World War, followed by some seven-years-long U.S.-led military occupation that involved complete demilitarization and subsequent security dependency on U.S. occupation forces. Since re-independence in 1952, however, such dependency has essentially continued until today, given the U.S.-imposed pacifist constitution that requires the renunciation of war and, in particular, the right of belligerency. Thus, even today, Japan only has compact yet technological sophisticated Self-Defense Forces (SDF) that consistently follows an exclusively defense-oriented policy, and possesses neither nuclear deterrents nor significant offensive power projection capabilities. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Forces (JMSDF) in fact can best perform as a blue water navy when it plays supplementary and complementary roles vis-à-vis the U.S. Navy 7th Fleet, arguably, constituting an integral part of it, while the Ground and the Air services (respectively, JGSDF and JASDF) focus on territorial defense.

The Japan-U.S. treaty merely sets a general political and strategic framework of bilateral alliance, without specifying the division of roles and missions of their militaries on which to construct detailed contingency and war plans as well as to formulate their respective armament and defense R&D policies. This effectively means that, prior to the first Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation of 1978, the alliance only exerted general deterrence effect, not specific deterrence effect based on the detailed

operational plans. The first Guidelines became necessary to counter significant Soviet military buildups in 1960s and 1970s that entailed weakening U.S. general deterrence effect, compounded by its staggering defense spending due to the post-Vietnam War structural vulnerabilities of the U.S. national economy. Despite considerable risk of getting entrapped into a U.S.-Soviet global war, Japan entered the Guidelines that focused on the territorial defense of Japan as military shield against the Soviet Far East. It also covered Japan's sea-lanes of communication offshore southward up to 1,000 nautical miles. Notably, those necessary mobile capabilities thereof, such as submarine and anti-submarine warfare capabilities as well as seaborne and airborne air-defense capabilities, could be and, most probably, were employed in the Seas of Okhotsk and Bering and their contiguous part of the northern Pacific.

In 1997, the U.S. and Japan redefined their alliance by entering the second Guidelines involving a new division of roles and missions of their militaries. Certainly, with the Cold War over, the alliance was adrift for a while, without facing any serious security threat. But, since North Korea's declaration of withdrawal from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in June 1994, the country's political-military brinksmanship concurrent with ceaseless drive toward nuclearization necessitated the alliance to develop contingency plans centered on the Korean Peninsula. It also made Japan to acquire and deploy a double-tiered U.S.-made missile system that was data-linked with the U.S. counterparts, especially, early warning satellites. These changes enhanced the level of integration of bilateral alliance.

In 1999, Japan enacted the Law on a Situation in the Areas Surrounding Japan, enabling the country to implement non-combat missions as required by the second Guidelines, such as logistical and other rear-area supports for U.S. forces. They are short of exercising the right of collective self-defense that the pacifist Constitution was then interpreted to strictly prohibit. True, "the areas surrounding Japan" is a situational, not geographical, concept serving as the criterion to judge when to apply the Law. Yet, it is evident that the North Korean crisis in 1990s was the

impetus behind the second Guidelines.

Seeing China's massive arms buildups, Japan came to recognize the country as a principal target of the second Guidelines. In February 2005, the United States and Japan announced a joint communiqué which openly regarded Taiwan as a common security concern.⁴⁾ Together with another joint communiqué later in the same year,⁵⁾ Japan evidently agreed in principle to give logistical and intelligence support to U.S. forces in the case of a Taiwan contingency, inevitably leading to conducting scenario-based feasibility studies. In fact, Director-General of Japan's Ministry of Defense Bureau of Defense Policy, Takamizawa Nobushige, answered to a question at a meeting of the Research Committee on Security of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) on March 13, 2008, that a Taiwan contingency would be treated as an area-surrounding-Japan situation. Former LDP Vice President Taku Yamazaki stated in the same meeting that, due to a highest sense of strategic ambiguity, Japan would not be able to make such a decision alone without consulting with the U.S., followed by the statement of Chief Cabinet Secretary Nobutaka Machimura that automatic application of the Law to a Taiwan contingency is impossible.⁶⁾ Obviously, the application then remained a mere hypothetical possibility without being backed up with strong political will and specific contingency plans.

Against the backdrop of these developments, Taiwan initially had a cautious optimism that it would not be able to depend on the Japan-U.S. alliance without a tripartite alliance, even though the strengthening of the former would exert some good deterrence effect on China not to resort to the threat and/or the use of force against Taiwan. A Taiwan's leading

4) Joint Statement, U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, February 19, 2005, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0502.html>, accessed on April 21, 2016.

5) Joint Statement, U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, October 29, 2005, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html>, accessed on April 21, 2016.

6) 「台湾有事は日本の問題 防衛政策局長が自民会合で発言」『産経新聞』2008年3月13日。

mainstream security expert, Cheng-Yi Lin, understood in 2006 that the possibility of trilateral coordination in security policy was very slim due to Japan's limited acquaintance with new developments in U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation and to Taiwan's unfamiliarity with those in the Japan-U.S. alliance.⁷⁾ After the Takamizawa's statement of 2008, however, Taiwan presumably came to develop a more optimistic view that Japan would support U.S. intervention in a Taiwan contingency through the bilateral alliance, without being sufficiently aware of specific details regarding how Japan could overcome legal and military constraints.⁸⁾

In 2015, the U.S. and Japan entered the third Guidelines to meet China's politico-military challenge, while seeing that the country was bent on becoming a regional hegemon. Japan accepted to significantly expand SDF's roles and missions, aiming to supplement and complement the U.S. military. This was necessary to reduce risk of being abandoned by the U.S. in the case of a contingency, especially one centered on the Senkaku Islands, given the deepening structural vulnerabilities of the U.S. national economy that involves growing uncertainty on its fiscal power and political will.

The third Guidelines is in sharp contrast to the second one, in that the former uses the phrase, "primary responsibility," at least nine times while the latter only uses four times. This means the former gives Japan more and broader "primary responsibilities" in roles and missions in addition to the latter's that used to be focus more narrowly on territorial defense. The new ones include defense over air and maritime approaches to Japan's territory and its surrounding waters and airspace, counter-ground attack against special operation, and the amphibious operation involving air strike and naval engagement to retake an island, as well as ballistic missile defense, emergency response to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents/attacks, and large-scale disaster relief in Japan. These

7) 林正義「日米安保の強化と台湾海峡の安全」『問題と研究』, Vol.35, No.2, March /April 2006, p.26.

8) 楊碧恆「由日本角度看『臺灣關係法』一日中關係與日美安保的視野」, 林碧恆・林正義(主編)『台灣關係法30年 美台中關係總體檢』, 巨流圖書公司, 2009, p.301. 林賢參「台湾海峡の安全保障における日本の役割」, *Aoyama Journal of International Studies*, No.1, 2014, p.33.

necessitate relative decline of the roles and missions of the U.S. armed forces, focusing on their support, supplementary, and backup functions vis-à-vis the SDF.

Furthermore, the third Guidelines as a policy document is significantly longer, with a newly added sub-section on “actions in response to an armed attack against a country other than Japan”, which may require the SDF to combat hand in hand with the U.S. armed forces. It also has another section on “cooperation for regional and global peace and security”, notably, including those necessary efforts for safe and secure sea-lines of communication such as counter-piracy and minesweeping, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and counterterrorism activities

Implementing the third Guidelines, therefore, required Japan to attain de facto constitutional amendment through reinterpretation concerning the right of collective self-defense. In July 1, 2014, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced the cabinet decision on well-articulated reinterpretation enabling partial exercise of the right of collective self-defense as related inseparably to that of individual self-defense, while it precluded outright exercise of the former. Consuming considerable political capital to cope with strong pacifist opposition, his government and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party succeeded in legislating a dozen of new and revised security-related laws that would be applied to authorize the SDF to carry out necessary combat operations with the U.S. military.

Unfortunately, Taiwan’s security policy community remains almost totally uninformed of the above important details of the third Guidelines. Naturally, it has failed to analyze their implications to its national security and to explore their specific policy options. This is obvious given the critical dearth of in-depth analysis in major English- and Chinese-language policy and academic journals in print and online,⁹⁾ except some superficial

9) These include *Journal of Strategic and Security Analyses* (『戰略安全研析』), *National Defense Journal* (『國防雜誌』), *The Journal of International Relations* (『(政治大學外交學系) 國際關係學報』), *Issues & Studies* (Chinese, English, and Japanese editions) (『問題與研究』『問題と研究』), *Review of Global Politics* (『全球政治評論』), *Straits Review Monthly* (『海峽評論』), 遠

commentaries based on chronological and/or ready-made information available in newspaper and other open sources.¹⁰⁾ To note, there is no scrupulous comparative examination of the three sets of Guidelines' texts from political, strategic, operational and tactical perspectives. This judgement is reinforced well by several private, anonymous, and off-the-record discussions with selected local security policy experts by the author of this study during his three-months-plus-long stay in Taiwan from February 2016 to May 2016.

望雜誌, 淡江國際與區域研究, *Tamkang Journal of International Affairs* (『淡江國際研究』), *Prospect Quarterly* (『遠景基金會季刊』), *Prospect Journal*, *Prospect & Exploration* (『展望與探索』), and Chinese-language policy essays on the website of the Taipei Forum (台北論壇), among others.

- 10) For example, 郭育仁「日本集體自衛權法制化發展與主要爭議」台北論壇, March 4, 2014; 何思慎「日相安倍訪美與東亞情勢」台北論壇, May 14, 2015; 何思慎「新安保法制立法中的日本民意動向」台北論壇, August 20, 2015; 郭育仁「日本的戰略憂慮:新安保法與安倍主義」台北論壇, November 12, 2015; 何思慎「日本在東亞的合縱連橫與日「中」關係」台北論壇, April 13, 2016; 王文岳「日本安保法制之修正與內容之剖析」『戰略安全研析』, No. 125, September 2015; and, 沈明室「美日同盟強化與中共南海軍事崛起」『戰略安全研析』, No. 126, October 2015.

2. Post-2015 Guidelines Agenda for Taiwan

1) U.S. peacetime operational needs in Taiwan's theater and their implications to peacetime Japan

The essential features of U.S. peacetime operational needs in the Taiwan theater are very similar to those of the three Guidelines, though many of them will not be attainable or will only be partially attainable due to the absence of the treaty-based formal inter-state relationship that precludes building a formal coordinating mechanism. These needs can be analogously inferred from the logic embedded in the first Guidelines in which the territorial defense of Japan was geared to countering Soviet regional and global challenge. This is because the territorial defense of Taiwan, in a very similar way, significantly contributes to U.S. regional and global security policy aimed to meet China's challenge. The second and third Guidelines can offer relevant in-depth details as related to territorial defense. Given cumulative effect of the three evolving Guidelines, however, the operational needs of the third one cannot be met without satisfying those of the first and then the second ones. The following discussion will imitate original texts of the three Guidelines as much as possible.

By emulating the first Guidelines, it is possible to say that the U.S. and Taiwan have to conduct studies on defense planning together for coordinated operations, not for cooperative and/or collaborative operations that require inter-state relationship as legal basis. The U.S. needs to provide Taiwan's armed forces with necessary operational knowledge and tactical skills for coordinated operation, particularly, through de facto exercise in the form of training and exchange. Also, the U.S. and Taiwan are in need of studying and formulating beforehand common procedures deemed necessary for smooth execution of coordinated operation. Such procedures include matters related to operations, intelligence and logistics. The U.S. and Taiwan need determining in advance mutual military communications/electronics requirements due to the central importance to command and control.

The U.S. and Taiwan need to develop and exchange intelligence essential for the defense of Taiwan. In order to ensure smooth intelligence exchange, their respective forces have to determine in coordination the nature of the intelligence to be exchanged and their specific units with assigned responsibilities. In addition, close bilateral intelligence cooperation has got to be promoted by taking such required actions as establishing mutual communication systems, all in organization, equipment hardware, and software.

Closely coordinating with the U.S. as the primary arms supplier, Taiwan also has to conduct studies in advance in regard to such functions as supply, transportation, maintenance, and facilities, so that U.S. support can be arranged appropriately when needed. Detailed requirements for this support has got to be developed through joint studies and coordinated planning in regard to foreseeable supply deficiencies, quantities, priorities for satisfying deficiencies, and emergency acquisition procedures.

As shown in the second Guidelines, it is obvious that, to enable higher-level U.S.-Taiwan coordination in peacetime, these two's militaries have to increase information and intelligence sharing, and the exchange of views on the territorial defense of Taiwan, and also to continue close consultations on defense policies and military postures. Such information sharing and policy consultations need to be conducted at as many levels and broad range of subjects as possible, and has to be accomplished by taking advantage of all available opportunities, centered on the establishment of an informal mechanism for defense talks and exchanges.

In planning coordinated response in the case of an armed attack against Taiwan, the U.S. and Taiwan have to make such efforts in an informal yet comprehensive mechanism involving relevant agencies of the respective governments, and establish the foundation for bilateral coordination. Also, Taiwan has got to enhance unilateral exercises and training with U.S. assistance so as to enable smooth and effective operational coordination with the U.S. forces in the case of a contingency. The U.S. and Taiwan have to establish an informal mechanism for peacetime bilateral coordination that involves relevant agencies, which is to be utilized in the event of a

contingency.

The third Guidelines serves as a limited but relevant model for far higher-level U.S.-Taiwan defense coordination, while significant parts of it are only feasible under the treaty-based matured U.S.-Japan alliance. To respond possible China's abrupt aggression, the U.S. and Taiwan have to monitor the Taiwan theater of operations, seamlessly both over time and across space. This involves the necessity of timely information sharing, the development and maintenance of common situational awareness, necessary procedures and infrastructure (including facilities as well as information and communication systems), and regular trainings and exercises.

The U.S. and Taiwan have to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) activities by taking advantage of the capabilities and availability of their respective assets. This will include conducting bilateral ISR activities in a mutually supportive manner to ensure persistent coverage of developments that could affect the defense of Taiwan. It is very difficult to enhance informal U.S.-Taiwan operational coordination between their respective chains-of-command, toward enhancement of interoperability, readiness, and vigilance. The U.S. has to assist Taiwan to maintain and strengthen its deterrence and defense postures against ballistic missile launches and aerial incursions. Also, the two militaries have got to cooperate on expanding early warning capabilities, interoperability, network coverage, and real-time information exchange and to pursue the comprehensive improvement of capabilities necessary to respond to the threat of ballistic missiles.

· Implications to peacetime Japan

The above U.S. peacetime operational needs must be satisfied without building a Japan-Taiwan inter-state relationship in general and a formal SDF-Taiwan force relationship in particular. The SDF would be able to provide the U.S. forces with significant parts of the necessary logistical and other rear-area supports in U.S. bases and facilities located on the Japanese archipelago, civil airports and ports thereof, and/or on high seas. In this light, the Southwest Islands centered of Okinawa are of paramount

importance due to their geographic proximity to the Taiwan theater. Such provision would be feasible almost solely through interaction between the SDF and the U.S. forces, with no involvement of the Taiwan forces.

Japan's efforts, therefore, must focus on satisfying U.S. operational needs of information and intelligence and, as a necessary condition of them, military communications/electronics requirements.¹¹⁾ This would be quite feasible given U.S.-Japan track record of intelligence- and information-sharing, as demonstrated by U.S.-led annual Rim-of-the-Pacific (RIMPAC) naval exercises and the bilateral joint operations coordination center (BJOCC) of ballistic missile and air defense at the Yokota Air Base in Tokyo that enables common situational awareness of the Far East, centered on the Japanese archipelago.

Given that the SDF has already had necessary assets and capabilities for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), the SDF and the U.S. forces just have to accumulate sufficient combat-ready experience in developing and maintaining common situational awareness as related to the Taiwan theater, through military exercises and other non-combat operation patrols on high seas and over its airspace as well as through innocent/transit passage. This requires fast and high-volume connectivity via datalink that involves meeting configuration and/or specification in hardware, software, protocol, and encryption. For this purpose, the SDF in

11) There is no official statement of Taiwan's government about possible agenda of bilateral defense talks and exchanges. As a reference, it is meaningful to point out the following extensive and unrealistic agenda that a Taiwanese defense policy analyst suggested: holding higher-level bilateral defense exchanges, building a mechanism for bilateral maritime security talks with a focus on the East and the South China Seas, sharing intelligence about the China air force's advance into the First Island Chain, formulating coordinated response to the maritime security issues, building a joint facility for reconnaissance and surveillance over the waters and their airspace from Taiwan's Hualien Area to Japan's Southwest Islands, including the Yonaguni and the Miyako, building a need-based joint ad-hoc base equipped with anti-ship and air-defense missile batteries for containing China's naval and air forces, and importing Japanese conventional submarines or at least obtaining Japan's technological assistance for the improvement of Taiwan's submarine warfare capability. See, 林賢參「日本大選後の台日安全關係」『戰略安全研析』, Vol. 117, January 2015, p. 31.

tandem with the U.S. forces needs to send, to the Taiwan theater, more seaborne, underwater, and airborne platforms loaded with advanced sensors and datalink capabilities as well as those with legacy assets and capabilities.

To avoid as much blue-on-blue friendly fire as possible in the case of a Taiwan contingency, it is desirable to include aircraft of the Taiwan air force in developing common situational awareness of the Taiwan theater. Yet, this does not require the aircraft to formally participate in military exercises and activities with the U.S. or Japan or both, but do so “virtually” through datalink while separately flying and/or navigating in the theater. Based on its semi-alliance relationship with Taiwan, the U.S. can make sure that Taiwan’s hardware, software, protocol, and encryption for military communication and electronics as well as doctrines are interoperable with the U.S. and Japanese counterparts. Such common situational awareness is prerequisite to coordinated but separate defensive and offensive operations of the U.S., the Japan, and the Taiwan forces.

Notably, Taiwan’s ground-based early warning radar, which is located on the top of the Leshan, about 2,600 meters high above sea level, plays a critical role for ballistic missile and air defense of the Taiwan theater, though it is an easy target to be destroyed once in war. It is a PAVE Phased Array Warning System (PAVE PAWS) radar that is based on the U.S. technology used in the Cold War. Most probably, it can detect flying objects in a range of 5,000 kilometers, enabling Taiwan to have comprehensive surveillance control of aerial activities from the Korean peninsula in the north to the Northwest Chinese continent in the west to the South China Sea in the South.¹²⁾ It was inadvertently revealed that the radar has been operated by standing personnel, the core of which includes several U.S. military servicepersons, and that early warning data has been provided on-line in real-time to the U.S. military information systems.¹³⁾ This strongly

12) “A Dossier on the Pave Paws Radar Installation on Leshan, Taiwan”, March 8, 2013, <http://fas.org/man/eprint/leshan.pdf>, accessed on April 28, 2016.

13) 「台國防部：先進雷達由美軍提供後勤支持」, BBC, October 5, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2013/10/131005_taiwan_us_radar, accessed on April

suggests that the common operational picture at the BJOCC in Yokota has already incorporated early warning information from the Leshan radar as input, though the realities thereof are totally classified.

If and only if U.S. global military communications and computer networks are available in the case of a Taiwan contingency, requiring the constituent assets to be present and/or functional as related to specific sectors of the operational theater, the SDF can rely on the U.S. forces as the manager of trilateral coordination. But, this assumption cannot necessarily be held given China's possession of anti-satellite missiles against U.S. space-based sensors and relays, and given uncertainty on U.S. deployment of capable platforms where necessary. Thus there has to be sufficient redundancy in electric connectivity with the networks and individual platforms of the Taiwan forces, necessitating the SDF to have those of its own when necessary.

Japan and Taiwan, therefore, are in keen need of building an informal mechanism for defense talks and exchanges to reach mutual understanding on their respective unilateral yet coordinated actions to be taken. The existing framework of informal bilateral interactions is devoid of such a mechanism.

2) U.S. wartime operational needs in a Taiwan contingency and their implications to peacetime Japan

Similarly, the essential features of U.S. wartime operational needs in the Taiwan theater are very similar to those of the three Guidelines when an armed attack against Japan occurs. Thus, by emulating the first Guidelines alone, it is possible to say that, when an armed attack against Taiwan is imminent, the U.S. and Taiwan have to conduct closer liaison and take necessary measures respectively. (This is because, without a U.S.-Taiwan inter-state relationship, there is no U.S. bases and forward deployed armed

28 : 「軍武」樂山基地長程預警雷達 年花7億請美維護」, *Now News*, October 5, 2013, <http://www.nownews.com/n/2013/10/05/985879>, accessed on April 28, 2016 ; and 「樂山雷達站」, 維基百科, <https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/樂山雷達站>, accessed on April 28, 2016.

forces in Taiwan that would enable higher-level bilateral operational collaboration, cooperation, and even coordination. Consequently, the U.S. has to rely on its power projection, particularly naval power including aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships and airpower via the Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa and the Andersen Air Force Base in Guam. Then, as deemed necessary under an evolving situation, the U.S. and the Taiwan forces will have got to make necessary preparations in order to ensure coordinated but separate action.

Then the U.S. and Taiwan need to establish in advance a common standard with regard to preparations which will be respectively conducted by the two militaries so that they may select coordinated readiness stages, and to ensure that effective preparations for operations can be undertaken respectively. This common standard will indicate readiness stages from an increase of unit alert posture to a maximization of combat readiness posture concerning intelligence activities, unit readiness, movements, logistics, and other matters relating to defense preparations. The U.S. and the Taiwan forces will respectively conduct defense preparations as considered necessary according to the readiness stages as mutually agreed.

When an armed attack against Taiwan takes place, in principle, Taiwan by itself has to repel limited, small-scale aggression. When it is difficult to repel aggression alone due to the scale, type and other factors of aggression, Taiwan has got to repel it with U.S. assistance. When the two militaries conduct separate but coordinated operations for the defense of Taiwan, they have to strive to achieve close mutual coordination in employing the defense capacity of each force in a timely and effective manner, with a major focus on the division of roles and missions over time and across space.

The Taiwan forces have to primarily conduct defensive operations in its own territory and its surrounding waters and airspace, while the U.S. forces need to support Taiwan's operations. Then, the U.S. forces have got to conduct operations to supplement the Taiwan forces in functional areas which exceed their capacity, and even complement them when they suffer a major loss.

The Taiwan and the U.S. forces have to conduct separate yet coordinated maritime operations for the defense of waters surrounding Taiwan and the protection of its sea-lines of communication. The Taiwan navy has got to primarily conduct operations for the protection of major ports in Taiwan, anti-submarine operations, and operations for the protection of ships. The U.S. navy has to support operations of the Taiwan navy and perhaps conduct those operations involving the use of task forces providing additional mobility and strike power, with the objective of repelling enemy forces.

The Taiwan and the U.S. air forces have to conduct separate yet coordinated air operations for the defense of Taiwan. The Taiwan air force has to conduct air defense, anti-airborne and anti-amphibious invasion, close air support, air reconnaissance, and airlift operations, while the U.S. air force needs to support the Taiwan counterpart's operations and perhaps conduct those operations involving the use of air units providing additional strike power, with the objective of repelling enemy forces.

The Taiwan and the U.S. forces have to take closely coordinated action through their respective command-and-control channels. In order to be able to conduct separate yet effective coordinated operations, these two forces have got to take action in accordance with operational processes which will be coordinated in advance. And, they need to maintain close mutual coordination in operations, intelligence, and logistic support through a virtual coordination center, possibly via tele-conferencing.

The U.S. and the Taiwan forces have to, through operations of their respective intelligence systems, conduct intelligence activities in close cooperation in order to contribute to the coordinated implementation of effective operations. To support this, these two forces need to coordinate intelligence activities closely at each stage of requirements, collection, production, and dissemination. The Taiwan and the U.S. militaries have responsibility for their respective security.¹⁴⁾

The U.S. has to provide Taiwan with necessary logistical support for defense systems and equipment of U.S. origin, particularly transportation

14) This author has examined important roles of military information-sharing and necessary institutional-building in the Japan-U.S. alliance. See, Masahiro

operations, including airlift and sealift of supplies from the U.S. to Taiwan. The U.S. has got to support the maintenance of items of U.S. origin, which are beyond Taiwan's maintenance capabilities. Maintenance support involves technical training of maintenance personnel.

· Implications to peacetime Japan

While the first Guidelines itself is rather silent in substance about a Taiwan contingency,¹⁵⁾ the second Guidelines introduces the concept, “a situation in areas surrounding Japan”, so as to cope with an evolving contingency that would probably threaten Japan's national security when the country itself is not yet under armed attack. The SDF has to support the U.S. forces in a timely and appropriate manner by ensuring the temporary use of additional facilities and areas on its soil, including SDF facilities and civilian airports and ports, and by providing other rear-area supports and activities, such as logistical supply, intelligence gathering, surveillance and minesweeping. These will help the SDF protect lives and property of the Japanese and ensure navigational safety, on the high seas

Matsumura, “Deepening Japan's Information Security Regime: The Need of Domestic Legislation”, Visiting Fellow Working Paper, U.S. National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, November 2013, <http://inss.ndu.edu/Publications/VisitingFellows.aspx>, accessed on April 28, 2016

15) As for Japan-U.S. cooperation in the case of a situation in the Far East that will have an important influence on the security of Japan, including a Taiwan contingency, the first Guidelines says as following: The Governments of Japan and the United States will consult together from time to time whenever changes in the circumstances so require. The scope and modalities of facilitative assistance to be extended by Japan to the U.S. Forces in the case of situations in the Far East outside of Japan which will have an important influence on the security of Japan will be governed by the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, its related arrangements, other relevant agreements between Japan and the United States, and the relevant laws and regulations of Japan.

The Governments of Japan and the United States will conduct studies in advance on the scope and modalities of facilitative assistance to be extended to the U.S. Forces by Japan with in the above-mentioned legal framework. Such studies will include the scope and modalities of joint use of the Self-Defense Forces bases by the U.S. Forces and of other facilitative assistance to be extended.

and international airspace around Japan which are distinguished from areas where combat operations are being conducted. The third Guidelines simply reinforces Japan's policy commitment to taking these measures.

Once in such a situation, Japan will surely take maximal advantage of prior determination of mutual military communications/electronics requirements and cumulative experience thereupon through separate but coordinated datalink-based activities in peacetime. This will dramatically enhance effectiveness and efficiency of U.S. military operation aimed to defend Taiwan.

Hence, Japan and Taiwan are in serious need of preventing blue-on-blue friendly fire by building an informal mechanism to reach mutual understanding on necessary additional measures beyond datalinks and common situational awareness, including hotlines at political, operational, and tactical levels.

3) Japan's wartime operational needs in Taiwan's theater and its implications to the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S. semi-alliance with Taiwan

The third Guidelines requires the SDF to conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force in responding to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and, as a result, threatens Japan's survival. This applies well to a Taiwan contingency.

Notably, Japan has already overcome domestic legal constraints on implementation of the third Guidelines. In accordance with the constitutional reinterpretation of 2014, followed by legislation in 2015 of a dozen of new and revised security-related laws, Japan will resort to partial exercise of the right of collective self-defense with the U.S. The right will be invoked when the following three conditions are met: (1) an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs, and (2) as a result, threatens the Japanese people, and (3) no alternative exists except the necessary minimal use of force as exercising the right of collective self-defense. This effectively means that, if China

attacks Taiwan, the SDF will defend U.S. forces engaged in a battle against China's forces in the Taiwan theater, by carrying out combat missions against them.

More broadly, the SDF and the U.S. forces have to cooperate in asset protection. Such cooperation will include, but not be limited to, protection of assets that are engaged in operations such as noncombatant evacuation operations or ballistic missile defense. Also, they will cooperate and provide support in search and rescue operations, including combat search and rescue. Yet, the SDF can easily shift to combat, if necessary, given that platforms for these roles and missions, such as helicopter carriers and Ageis destroyers, in fact have multiple warfighting capabilities and functions.

The SDF and the U.S. forces have to cooperate in minesweeping, including that to secure the safety of sea-lines of communication. Also, they will cooperate in escort operations to protect ships and vessels. They will cooperate in the interdiction of shipping activities providing support to adversaries involved in the armed attack. Also, they have got to cooperate in intercepting ballistic missiles in accordance with their respective capabilities. The two militaries will exchange information to ensure early detection of ballistic missile launches.

· Implications to the U.S.-Japan alliance and the U.S. semi-alliance with Taiwan

Even under the pacifist constitution, Japan will be free of any substantial domestic legal constraints on the use of force when China attacks a U.S. force in the Taiwan theater as well as once China attacks Japan, including attack against an SDF base and a facility, against an SDF force in Japan or on high seas or over its airspace, and against a U.S. base, a facility, and a force in Japan. Also, once in wartime, Japan will not any longer have to restrain itself from building a formal military-to-military, if not diplomatic, relations with Taiwan. This is because the restraint is only necessary not to send China a message that Japan supports a de jure independent Taiwan, that is, to avoid giving China unnecessary provocation or pretext

to attack Taiwan.

In peacetime, it is very difficult to anticipate exact SDF operational needs vis-à-vis the Taiwan forces because the needs vary according to dynamic U.S. operation.¹⁶⁾ True, it is possible to speculate these needs by using U.S.-Japan-Taiwan trilateral scenario planning. Yet, China will surely get wind of such a move, given its close monitoring on Taiwan-Japan relations, and then the move may unnecessarily provoke China to resort to the use of force against Taiwan. On the whole, it would be best for Japan and Taiwan to build and develop an informal peacetime mechanism for defense talks and exchange, as envisioned in this study, so that it can make smooth transition to the wartime formal coordination mechanism while nurturing inter-personal relationships between defense policymakers and military leaders.

16) In response to the recent U.S. Air-Sea Battle concept, this author personally conducted a pilot study for possible U.S.-Japan-Taiwan coordination in military strategy. In order to go beyond such a proposal specific to the strategy, it is necessary to achieve continuous and systematic efforts through a standing unofficial mechanism. See, Masahiro Matsumura, "The Limits and Implications of the Air-Sea Battle Concept: A Japanese Perspective," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Vol.15, No.3, 2014, <http://www.jmss.org/jmss/index.php/jmss/article/view/544>. accessed on April 28, 2016 An early draft of this paper was presented at the 6th Defense Forum on Regional Security held in Taipei, Republic of China (Taiwan), sponsored by the ROC Ministry of National Defense, on July 24, 2012.

3. Unofficial Bilateral Relations and Constraints

1) Japan

Upon opening diplomatic relations with China, Japan severed those with Taiwan and instead set up unofficial instrumentalities to manage their commercial, cultural, tourist and other relations. For this purpose, the Japanese government in cooperation with the business community established a private non-profit foundation, *Koryu Kyoukai* (or the Interexchange Association, or IEA) based on the civil code. Its successive Chairmen include Teizo Horikoshi (Vice Chairman of the Japanese Business Federation [Keidanren], December 1972–September 1984), Chikashige Hasegawa (Vice Chairman of Keidanren, September 1984–September 1993), Reijiro Hatsutori (Chairman Emeritus of SEIKO, September 1993–June 2011), and Mitsuo Oashi (Corporate Adviser of the Sowa Denko, June 2011–present). The successive Chief Executive Officers of the Headquarters in Tokyo as well as heads of the mission in Taipei, who have the de facto rank of ambassador, all have been Japan’s diplomats who experienced ambassadorship positions.¹⁷⁾ The core officials of the foundation, including heads of the mission in Kaohsiung, which have the de facto rank of consul general, have almost always Japanese diplomats or bureaucrats temporarily on leave of absence from their active service, or those retired from active service. Evidently, Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) has consistently retained firm grip over the foundation headquarters, its missions in Taipei and Kaohsiung, and Japan’s overall informal relationship with Taiwan. This is demonstrated well, for example, by its budget of the fiscal year 2016 in which 86.5% of its revenue comes from the MOFA’s subsidies.¹⁸⁾

17) 「交流協会」、ウィキペディア、<https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/交流協会>, accessed on April 30, 2016.

18) 「平成28年度収支予算書」、公益財団法人 交流協会、March 2016, [https://www.koryu.or.jp/ez3_contents.nsf/15aef977a6d6761f49256de4002084ae/03e3fa88c33891ad492576d600376474/\\$FILE/H28shuushiyosansho.pdf](https://www.koryu.or.jp/ez3_contents.nsf/15aef977a6d6761f49256de4002084ae/03e3fa88c33891ad492576d600376474/$FILE/H28shuushiyosansho.pdf), accessed on April 30, 2016.

The IEA Articles stipulate its purpose and functions respectively in Article 3 and 4. The purpose is strictly limited to commercial, tourist, cultural and other non-diplomatic relations. The functions fall upon all the practical business affairs of bilateral relations that are thoroughly consistent with the purpose, yet including negotiation and conclusion of non-governmental bilateral agreements; they will be binding by obtaining consent of respective authorities for implementation and enforcement according to their respective domestic jurisdiction. As a result, the mission in Taipei plays a far more extensive and broad role than a consulate general, particularly, given that those having experienced ambassadorship positions have consistently headed it.

The informal framework for Japan-Taiwan interaction is necessary to satisfy not only international legal requirements involved in recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and derecognition of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan but also political conditions of stabilizing far more strategically, militarily, and economically important but often conflictual relations with the PRC. According to the PRC-Japan Joint Communiqué of 1972, the PRC reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of its territory; and Japan fully understands and respects the PRC's stand. This means Japan gave no recognition to the PRC's claim according to international law. Rather, Japan renounced the title of Taiwan without reassigning it in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Also, the treaty stipulates in Article 26: Should Japan make a peace settlement or war claims settlement with any state granting that state greater advantages than those provided by the peace treaty, those same advantages shall be extended to the parties to the peace treaty. Thus, Japan must not recognize the PRC claim on Taiwan. Logically, Japan sees the status of Taiwan remains undetermined as of today,¹⁹⁾ and firmly adheres to the policy line thereof.

In managing informal relations with Japan, Taiwan has set up the non-

19) In fact, Masaki Saito, head of the mission in Taipei of the Interexchange Association publicly stated that the status of Taiwan remained undetermined, although he was later forced to resign due to the statement. See, 「『地位未定』発言で日台膠着状態」『産経新聞』, July 28, 2009.

governmental Association of East Asian Relations (AEAR), with branches in Tokyo, Yokohama, Osaka, Fukuoka, and Naha. The one in Tokyo is comparable to an embassy, the ones in Osaka and Fukuoka consulate generals, and the ones in Yokohama and Naha consulates. Taiwan's MOFA relegates all the practical business matters to the Association in accordance with Article 7 of the MOFA Organization Law (外交部組織法). In reality, the core AEAR officials are dual-hatted with key officials in charge at the MOFA Department of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. As for mutual treatment of informal missions, Japan and Taiwan extend significant de facto privileges and immunities that are short of diplomatic ones, as demonstrated by established practice based on reciprocal exercise of policy/administrative discretion.

2) The U.S.

With recognition of the PRC and concurrent derecognition of the ROC on January 1, 1979, several years after Japan's move, the U.S. enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to enable continuation of non-governmental bilateral relations with Taiwan. It provides a domestic legal basis on which to continue a semi-alliance relationship with Taiwan even after the abrogation of bilateral security treaty, as well as diverse commercial, tourist, cultural, and other relations.

As Hungdah Chiu points out aptly, the Japanese formula cannot be applied directly to the U.S. case due to several reasons. Japan has an executive-dominated government involving wide administrative discretion in dealing with foreign affairs, while the U.S. has law-dominated government requiring clear legal authorization. And, Japan has no security commitments to Taiwan, though the U.S. has strong ones. Also, Japan sees no possibility of confrontation between the executive and legislative branches of government given a cabinet system in which the prime minister is the top leader of a majority party of the Japanese Diet. On the other hand, the U.S. separation of powers involves good possibility of confrontation between the two branches, particularly because the Congress

opposed the ROC derecognition upon the PRC recognition.²⁰⁾

Based on the TRA and Executive Order No. 12143 of June 22, 1979, later superseded by Executive Order 13014 of August 15, 1996, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) has been set up as a nonprofit private corporation under District of Columbia law, staffed with veteran diplomats or other civil servants temporarily on leave of absence from the U.S. government.²¹⁾ Taiwan's MOFA has set up the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA) as an extra-ministerial board based on an administrative ordinance (北美事務協調委員會組織規程), with an office in Washington D. C. and branch offices in New York, Chicago, Atlanta, Houston, Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Honolulu. This is in marked contrast to Taiwan's approach to Japan that the non-governmental AEAR runs bilateral relations. As for mutual treatment of the informal missions, the U.S. and Taiwan extend reciprocal *de jure* privileges and immunities very similar to diplomatic ones according to respective domestic legal instruments. With the TRA's explicit authorization, the U.S. entered such a non-governmental bilateral agreement with Taiwan.²²⁾

3) Similarities and differences

For the purpose of this study, it is crucial to emphasize total lack of defense-related function in Japan-Taiwan interaction, which is in sharp contrast to the U.S.-Taiwan case with U.S. ambiguous defense commitment to Taiwan and a statutory function as related specifically to arms sales to Taiwan. As for handling economic, cultural, tourist, and other relations, the two cases share high commonalities in overall pattern, thought, of course, there are differences in detail that could matter in specific issue areas.

20) Hungdah Chiu, "The Taiwan Relations Act and Sino-American Relations", *Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contemporary Asian Studies*, No. 5, 1990, School of Law, University of Maryland, pp. 11-12.

21) *Ibid.*, p. 13

22) Agreement on Privileges, Exemptions and Immunities between the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States.

The difference originates from the absence and presence of legal interest in the defense of Taiwan. Japan has no legal interest whatsoever, given that it renounced the sovereignty of Taiwan under the San Francisco Peace Treaty and that it does not recognize the ROC/Taiwan as a de jure state. On the other hand, the U.S. entered the Mutual Defense Treaty with the ROC in 1954. With the treaty abrogated in 1979, the U.S. instead enacted the TRA as a domestic legal instrument, which is congruent with the circumstances of legal procedures on the post-surrender occupation of Taiwan as an imperial Japan's territory. U.S. General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), issued the SCAP Directive 1 on September 2, 1945, requiring all the Japanese forces in Taiwan to surrender to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek. Thus the ROC forces under Chiang that carried out military occupation was legally a SCAP agent, and, given that the U.S. led the General Headquarters of the SCAP, both in staff and policy making, a de facto U.S. agent. It does make some sense to apply the domestic legal instrument to handling relations with Taiwan, arguably, under the continued occupation by the agent.

Already in the initial formative years after derecognition, the difference resulted in two distinct patterns of the actual practice of Japan-Taiwan and U.S. -Taiwan non-governmental interactions. The former interactions have strictly adhered to the non-governmental framework of the IEA and the AEAR, serving as the sole interface of indirect inter-state interaction. Hence, this means that, as the matter of official position, Japan's Ministry of Defense (MOD) policy makers and SDF leaders must not have official policy talks and exchanges with Taiwan's counterparts. This is because these interactions constitute inter-state governmental relations, given that the military is an exemplar state organ.

On the other hand, the latter interactions are potentially flexible due to the entrenched U.S. separation of powers, involving the check and balance in foreign policy between the legislative and the executive, especially regarding the derecognition of Taiwan as demonstrated by the legislative process and circumstances of the TRA, as well as between the judiciary and the executive branches. As Chiu observed, the Reagan Administration

made direct contacts with CCNAA and ROC officials, while working-level CCNAA officials were free to call on their U.S. counterparts for official business, except those at the Department of State and the Executive Office of the President. Also, members of the ROC legislature were allowed to call on State Department officials.²³⁾ Moreover, there is sufficient room for maneuver to build bilateral defense talks and exchanges unless they form inter-state relations, owing to the TRA's limited statutory authorization for arms sales to Taiwan that entails related information gathering and official contacts of Defense Department officials and military personnel with ROC counterparts.

23) Chiu, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

4. U.S.-Taiwan Institutional Innovation: the Monterey and Other Talks

1) U.S. and Taiwan's motives and agenda

With the Cold War over and a decade since the start of open door policy in 1978 under Deng Xiaoping, the U.S. and Taiwan gradually came to have growing concerns about China's rise, particularly its massive arms buildups that posed greater risks to Taiwan's security, heightened by the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis. Located on the other side of the Pacific, Taiwan had to be able to defend itself, at least until the arrival of U.S. intervention forces.

Based on the public testimonies by U.S. Department of Defense policy makers and planners at Congress-sanctioned U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission on February 6, 2004, Michael Pillsbury, a former China/Taiwan policy planner at the Defense Department and later a leading policy analyst in the field, summarized well six reasons why the U.S. had to play a critical role in Taiwan's defense reform.

- 1) The PRC's ambitious military modernization casts a cloud over Beijing's declared preference for resolving differences with Taiwan through peaceful means. Taiwan faces an increasingly powerful PRC with an accelerated military modernization program aimed at its force options versus Taiwan. As the PRC rapidly modernizes its military in order to provide its leadership with credible options for the use of force, Taiwan's relative military strength will deteriorate, unless it makes significant investments in its defense.
- 2) As the PRC accelerates its force modernization program, Taiwan remains isolated in the international community, especially in the area of security cooperation. Although several states quietly collaborate with Taiwan on security matters, the United States stands alone in its political courage, strategic imperative, and sense of moral responsibility in assisting the security of Taiwan's

democracy.

- 3) Taiwan's defense establishment faces a wide array of other challenges as it attempts to keep pace with developments across the Taiwan Strait. Opinion polls consistently indicate a lack of popular concern about attack from China, so Taiwan is faced with an increasingly constrained defense budget. Over the last 10 years, Taiwan's defense budget has shrunk in real terms and as a proportion of its gross domestic product (GDP).
- 4) Taiwan's challenges are serious, but not insurmountable. Our defense relationship with Taiwan seeks to reverse negative trends in its ability to defend itself, possibly obviating the need for massive U.S. intervention in a crisis, and allowing Taiwan's political leaders to determine the island's future from a position of strength.
- 5) If deterrence fails, Taiwan, supported by the U.S. and its allies, must be prepared to swiftly defeat the PRC's use of force.
- 6) The PLA's growing sophistication, including its efforts to complicate U.S. intervention, calls for more consistent strategic harmonization between the U.S. and Taiwan to improve Taiwan's ability to defend itself and reduce the danger to U.S. forces should intervention become necessary.²⁴⁾

A leading Taiwanese defense policy analyst and a leading policy maker, Andrew N.D. Yang, sorts out possible China's strike operations against Taiwan into the three phases.

Phase1: a sudden, overwhelming attack on the critical strategic and military targets using air power and special forces designed to force rapid conclusion to the war;

Phase2: an effective naval blockade of major ports, to be followed by an extended air campaign designed to cripple Taiwan economically

24) Michael Pillsbury, "The role of the United States in Taiwan's defense reform", in Martin Edmonds and Michael M.Tsai, ed., *Taiwan's Defense Reform*, Routledge, 2006, pp. 148–149.

and militarily;

Phase3: an amphibious landing to facilitate a multidivisional armored and mechanized attack on the political center.²⁵⁾

Also, Pillsbury points out four feasible options for China's attack against Taiwan: maritime quarantine or blockade, limited force or "no war" options, air and missile campaign, and amphibious invasion.²⁶⁾

In order to develop effective contingency plans for these possible attacks, the U.S. has to ensure and, if necessary, assist Taiwan to be equipped with necessary defense capability. Yet, in the late 1990s, it became increasingly clear that the U.S. not only remained largely uninformed of the state, conditions, and total defense capability of Taiwan's military but also had no contact with Taiwan's military leaders and even no regular communication channels with them. This resulted from near complete cessation of military contact with Taiwan after derecognition, except annual procurement-focused contact as related to arms sales, involving severe isolation of the military leadership. More specifically, from the 1950s to 1978, the U.S. deployed its armed forces in Taiwan, including nuclear weapons until 1974, while placing them under the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Command with two flag-rank officers and their staff together with the military assistance advisory group inside the U.S. embassy in Taipei that was headed by a U.S. general or admiral. Without the command after derecognition, the U.S. and the Taiwan forces no longer made joint contingency plans nor conducted bilateral exercises. The U.S. military no longer had operational contact with the Taiwan counterpart nor provide direct military advice.²⁷⁾ This effectively means that the Taiwan military was almost completely isolated, except minimal contact at the time of U.S.

25) Andrew N.D. Yang, "Taiwan's Preparation against Beijing's Military Attacks", in Shiping Hua, ed., *Reflections on the Triangular Relations of Beijing-Taipei-Washington Since 1995*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p. 178.

26) Michael Pillsbury, "U.S. Debates About Taiwan's Security, 1979-2009", in Cheng-yi Lin and Denny Roy, ed., *The Future of United States, China, and Taiwan Relations*, Palgrave Macmillan, U.S., 2011, pp. 236-237.

27) *Ibid*, p. 212.

annual arms sales.²⁸⁾ Consequently, it failed to experience any meaningful technological, doctrinal, organizational and other related changes as required to be an advanced modern military. This circumstance was particularly conspicuous because the military then still remained a “party-controlled”, “highly insulated and secretive institution” under “the direct and virtually exclusive control of the president and his immediate subordinates”;²⁹⁾ and because the U.S. was heavily involved in defense reform of post-Soviet East European militaries, transforming them to be interoperable with the U.S. and its major European allies’ militaries.

Naturally, from a U.S. perspective, Taiwan’s defense reform and modernization necessarily included the following four key issue-areas: (1) civil-military relations, (2) military streamlining and restructuring, (3) national security and military strategy, and (4) weapons and technology procurement.³⁰⁾ In concrete terms, the U.S. needed building an informal working-level mechanism for defense talks with Taiwan, focusing on diversification and enhancement of bilateral defense relationship, especially Taiwan’s utilization of U.S.-made advanced military equipment to balance the increase in U.S. engagement with China and discussion on the implications of China’s military modernization.³¹⁾

On the other hand, Taiwan also had compelling reasons to carry out defense reform. The lifting of martial law in 1987 necessitated the

28) “Throughout the 1980s, and the first half of the 1990s, not only the U.S.-Taiwan defense relationship focused largely on arms sale, but also it was ‘highly ritualized,’ according to U.S. officials. Visits to Taiwan by U.S. military personnel were restricted to the O-6 level (a captain in the U.S. Navy; a colonel in the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps) and below, and only visits that were related to the arms sales process were permitted. Department of Defense civilian personnel above the rank of GS-15 were not allowed to visit Taiwan and Taiwan-U.S. exchanges focusing on operational matters were strictly limited.” Michael Chase, “U.S.-Taiwan Security Cooperation: Enhancing an Unofficial Relationship”, in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, ed., *Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis*, Columbia University Press, 2008, p. 165.

29) Michael D. Swaine, “Taiwan’s Reforms and Military Modernization: Objectives, Achievements, and Obstacles”, in Tucker, *Ibid*, p. 133.

30) *Ibid*, p. 132.

31) Chase, *op. cit*, p. 174.

liberalization and democratization of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) regime as a one-party dictatorship and, as a result, “depoliticization of the military and the strengthening of civilian control” of it. Under the evolutionary change, the Taiwan military also underwent strong “economic pressure in support of cost reduction” aimed to “decrease the overall size of the military”. The military was also driven by the expectation that its key units were able to readily benefit from defense reform involving U.S. military technical assistance and training in improving their readiness and night fighting capabilities. Most importantly, the military had to accommodate continuous U.S. pressure regarding “many arms acquisitions, improvements in many military support systems, and organizational restructuring”.³²⁾

2) The evolution of functional development

The first step was a joint decision to have a bilateral meeting in Monterey, California, in December 1997 for strategy discussions, while avoiding discussion on arms sales. The evolutionary process up to late 2003 saw nine rounds of the so-called Monterey Talks, under the slogan “software, not hardware”, in which heads of the Pentagon’s China desk continuously played the key roles in the U.S. effort to support Taiwan’s defense reform.³³⁾

The second step was to build the Defense Review Talks, focusing on strategic planning process aimed to produce feedback for setting an agenda of the Monterey Talks of a following year. The first talks took place in 1998 with a low-profile special DOD delegation to Taiwan headed by the then-acting deputy assistant (later, permanent) secretary of defense for strategy. The delegation presented, to a group of more than 70 Taiwan military officers, key U.S. concepts of the role of civilians in developing

32) Swaine, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

33) Pillsbury, “The role of the United States in Taiwan’s defense reform”, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

military plans and the process of developing national military strategy, such as net assessment and strategic planning.³⁴⁾ In this context, the creation of the General Officer Steering Group in 2003 was significant. It focuses on operational- and tactical-level discussions to enhance interoperability between the U.S. and the Taiwan forces. The group is subordinate to the Defense Review Talks and then the Monterey Talks.³⁵⁾

The third step was to send U.S. survey teams to Taiwan so as to comprehend its defense priorities through operator-to-operator direct contact and on-site inspection at bases or in the fields. The review focused on Taiwan's weaknesses and needs in three key warfighting areas – air defense, anti-submarine operations, and counter-landing operations. Then, it came up with some 300 recommendations involving measures related to defense reform. This process greatly rendered U.S. arms sales to Taiwan more transparent to the eyes of its military that used to be very isolated, and partially eliminated underlying drivers that frustrated the sale.³⁶⁾

Already in 2003, Pillsbury argued for synergy among the first three steps that enabled much closer and more frequent consultations between the U.S. and the Taiwan militaries. The synergy occurred among assessment and survey, strategic planning, and integrated threat assessment. This was a drastic departure from the longtime infrequent and limited bilateral contact between the two militaries, which, on the U.S. side, was monopolized and managed solely by security assistance authorities and retired officers assigned to the AIT in Taiwan. It is noteworthy to see that

34) *Ibid.*

35) “United States Security Dialogue with Taiwan”, WikiLeaks (10TAIPEI195_a), February 25, 2010, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10TAIPEI195_a.html, accessed on May 7, 2016.

36) Pillsbury, “The role of the United States in Taiwan’s defense reform”, *op. cit.*, pp. 144–145. Here, Pillsbury also points out: “For example, the sale of 150 F-16s that finally occurred in 1992 had come only after a decade of urgent requests from Taiwan, without a single U.S. survey team visiting the island. Similarly, diesel submarines had been called “offensive” and denied for a decade, until after the visit of an expert survey team in 2000, and the subsequent approval of submarines in 2001. Taiwan’s request for Apache attack helicopters had been seen as unnecessary and “offensive” too, and this finding too was reversed after a survey team visit,” *Ibid.*, p. 145.

the evolutionary development, short of restoration of the abrogated U.S.-ROC Mutual Security Treaty, materialized despite strong opposition of many U.S. China experts who were concerned with possible negative impact on U.S. -China relations.³⁷⁾

The fourth step was taken in 2001 in order to strengthen annual Security Cooperation Talks that were already set in 1995. The talks were held by DoD's Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and Taiwan Ministry of National Defense's (MND's) Strategic Planning Department (U.S. Joint Staff-equivalent). The talks focused on reviewing current and future Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs, reforming the content and process, and discussing about overall security cooperation for Taiwan's defense reform, which involved raising the civilian control of the military. The talks were supplemented by its subordinate organ that was usually held in conjunction with the Defense Review Talks. This approach constituted a marked departure from longtime one-day discussion to talks on a rolling basis as needed.³⁸⁾ At this level of bilateral talks, visits by high-ranking military officials and civilian defense officials are purely political and symbolic with no substance involved. From 2005, the U.S. sent active duty officers, not retired ones, to the AIT in Taipei.³⁹⁾

The fifth step became gradually apparent in 2003, with U.S. recommendations to Taiwan on key defense priorities in defense spending, centered on C4ISR and missile defense. They required enhancing the interoperability and jointness among all the Taiwan forces, which would also enable them to cooperate with the U.S. forces and other potential security partners, especially the SDF, if necessary in wartime.⁴⁰⁾ It should be noted that, as a precondition to exchange necessary but classified or

37) *Ibid*, pp. 145-146.

38) *Ibid*, p. 146. Also, see, WikiLeaks, *op. cit.*

39) Alexander Chieh-Cheng Huang, "The United States and Taiwan's Defense Transformation", *Brookings Taiwan-U.S. Quarterly Analysis*, No. 2. February 2010, <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2010/02/taiwan-defense-huang>, accessed on May 9, 2016.

40) Pillsbury, "The role of the United States in Taiwan's defense reform", *op. cit.*, pp. 146-147

sensitive military information for discussion, on August 4, 2004, the U.S. and Taiwan, through the AIT in Taiwan and the CCNAA, entered an agreement concerning general security of military information, with a focus on research and development.⁴¹⁾ Then, to discuss policies in information and communication technologies (ICT), including concepts, feasibility investigations, evaluations, technology and experimentation, another bilateral agreement was concluded on October 31, 2007 concerning an ICT forum.⁴²⁾

With continuous evolution over the several years, State Department-led political-military talks was held first in Washington, D. C. in fall 2009 as the inaugural session of the Monterey Talks, co-hosted by the then-Assistant Secretaries of State in Political-Military and in East Asian & Pacific Affairs where interagency delegations from both sides participated. Based on reciprocity, Taiwan's delegation was led by a Taiwan's MOFA Director General, an equivalent to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State. The Taiwan side proposed to hold the Talks annually in D. C., with agenda jointly set by the MOFA and the State Department through the AIT, while expressing its desire to upgrade its head of delegation to a Vice Foreign Minister even without U.S. reciprocation. Also, the Talks in Washington offered a rare opportunity for bilateral dialogue on political-military issues, due to longtime U.S. policy restrictions on visits to Taiwan by policy-level government officials higher than a deputy assistant secretary of State and/or Defense. Also, the Talks offered such an opportunity for Taiwan to emulate U.S. interagency coordination, which

41) Agreement of the Department of Defense of the United States of America to Assume the Responsibilities of the Designated Representative of the American Institute in Taiwan Under the Agreement Between the American Institute in Taiwan and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States Concerning Exchange of Research and Development Information, signed on August 4, 2004, <http://www.ait.org.tw/en/tecro-agreement/107.pdf>, accessed on May 11, 2016.

42) Taiwan Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) and American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) Forum Terms of Reference <http://www.ait.org.tw/en/tecro-agreement/108.pdf>, accessed on May 11, 2016.

would enable strengthening necessary bilateral communication and coordination to shift toward a more integrated political-military policy process.⁴³⁾

The annual meeting of the two interagency delegations in 2009 was the then-highest level bilateral security dialogue: the Monterey Talks. Yet, the U.S. side saw that, while U.S. and Taiwan's participants conducted briefings and tabletop exercises, each with more than 50 Taiwanese participants, hampered the free flow of ideas; in addition, many technical experts gave remarkably detailed and in-depth briefings, only turning out to be rather meaningless for senior officials.⁴⁴⁾

In 2009, the head of the AIT in Taipei considered it appropriate to include government officials from various departments and agencies, such as Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, National Security Council, and AIT, among others on the U.S. side, and their counterparts on the Taiwan's side. As a result, he saw the followings as possible agenda: (1) U.S. interagency cooperation and civil-military relations (1947 National Security Act: State-Defense/Defense-State Collaboration), (2) regional and cross strait relations (including how confidence building measures can support the relations), (3) impact of Taiwan's defense reforms and civil-military relations, (4) interagency role in arms acquisition, (5) Non-future combat system armaments acquisition/production (direct commercial sales; development of domestic production capabilities) – export control and licensing, and (6) homeland security issues (critical infrastructure protection; continuity of operations; harbor protection).⁴⁵⁾

For the last several years, there has been no significant open source information, including WikiLeaks, on the development of the Monterey Talks and other subordinate talks. This is perhaps because the basic institutional framework and agenda of these talks were already set well and have made steady progress, though in-depth and detail discussion still

43) WikiLeaks, *op. cit.*

44) *Ibid.*

45) "Taiwan MOFA Proposes POL/MIL Talks", WikiLeaks (09TAIPEI343_a), March 25, 2009, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09TAIPEI341_a.html, accessed on May 8, 2016.

underway in the evolving global and regional strategic contexts.

3) Achievements, limits, and future agenda

With security clearance procedures completed through the U.S. Department of Defense, Pillsbury offered his “personal” assessment on the development of U.S.-Taiwan security relationships centered on the Monterey Talks processes. The assessment was based on his own knowledge, experience and perspective as a former leading Pentagon insider in China/Taiwan-related policy making and a leading analyst in the field. Referring to the public testimonies at the Congress-sanctioned U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission held on February 6, 2004, he gave the following provisional assessment:

- 1) Taiwan is developing an integrated national security; joint doctrine; and integrated capabilities for training, employing and sustaining joint forces.
- 2) Taiwan has succeeded in focusing attention on critical steps that must be taken in order to enhance Taiwan’s defense in the next 3-5 years.
- 3) For the first time in 10 years, Taiwan has increased its defense budget as a proportion of its gross domestic product.
- 4) It has taken positive steps to modernize its C4ISR system.
- 5) Taiwan is undercutting the political and military utility of the PRC’s most effective means of coercion—its growing arsenal of increasingly accurate and lethal conventional ballistic missiles and ever more capable submarine force. It has invested in passive defense systems.
- 6) Taiwan has streamlined its military force.
- 7) Taiwan has addressed pilot shortages.
- 8) Taiwan has drafted and implemented a detailed plan for the recruitment and retention of civilian personnel.⁴⁶⁾

46) Pillsbury, “The role of the United States in Taiwan’s defense reform”, *op. cit.*, pp. 147–148.

More specifically, in 2000, Taiwan enacted the National Defense Law and the National Defense Organizational Law, which requires one-third of MND officials to become civilians. (Yet, the initial phase could not clear up strong continued influence of the military, because civilian staffing had to rely on retired military officers due to the dearth of military expertise in the civil society.) Taiwan's military also cut the political warfare department apparatus, which was closely associated with the KMT dictatorship. It then achieved significant force consolidation in manpower from 370,000 to 325,000, considering a partial or full volunteer military with more professional noncommissioned officers. Under the two new laws, emulating the U.S. approach, the MND established the Strategic Planning Department, including the in-house Integrated Assessment Office in 2000 and the U.S.-Taiwan Military Cooperation Group in 2002.⁴⁷⁾

As a result, Taiwan also became increasingly aware of the importance of the following issues, and took some necessary measures to fill in the gap:

- 1) Acquisition of more mobile ground, air, naval combat platforms;
- 2) Improvement of anti-submarine warfare capability, air and missile defense capabilities, more potent joint warfare capability, early warning reconnaissance, surveillance and battle management systems through acquiring P3-C ASW aircraft, Kidd-class frigates, more capable air-to-air, air-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, more advanced attack helicopters; and
- 3) Acquisition of long-range EW radar, upgrading of tactical radar, and improvements in C4ISR capabilities.⁴⁸⁾

Yet, the U.S. and Taiwan have faced new problems stemming from these achievements. Already in 2006, the U.S. side increasingly found that the Monterey talks of the year lacked substance, involving the diminished level

47) Swaine, *op. cit.* pp. 134–146.

48) *Ibid*, pp. 137–157.

of U.S. interest.⁴⁹⁾

Prior to the Monterey Talks of 2009, the Taiwan side proposed to widen the scope and range of the Talks, involving significantly more participants. It regarded that “the existing dialogues (tended) to focus on strictly military issues, and (proposed) to strengthen the relatively weak political and interagency aspects of bilateral security relationship.”⁵⁰⁾ Then the head of the AIT in Taipei pointed out “a risk that the increasing number of participants in the Monterey Talks (would) dilute their value as a venue for high-level dialogue”.⁵¹⁾

In sum, the U.S. and Taiwan have successfully built an informal yet extensive mechanism of bilateral talks and exchanges in strategic and defense issues. It greatly facilitated Taiwan’s defense reform in organizational restructuring, strategic planning, and operational/tactical doctrinal sophistication, and solidly oriented Taiwan’s military toward acquisition of net-centric platforms, weaponry, and equipment, all of which steadily enhanced its warfighting capabilities, jointness among their services, and the potential to be interoperable with the U.S. and its allies’ forces.⁵²⁾ While reform efforts are still underway, now with a focus on technical and organizational details, the U.S. and Taiwan are experiencing some dissonance regarding where to put priority, either on widening or deepening of the reform. It appears that Taiwan is prone to choosing the former while the U.S. stresses the latter.

49) Nadio Tsao, “Monterey talks in the US inconclusive”, *Taipei Times*, July 05, 2006, <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2006/07/05/2003317335>, accessed on May 9, 2016.

50) WikiLeaks (09TAIPEI343_a), *op. cit.*

51) WikiLeaks (10TAIPEI95_a), *op. cit.*

52) China has closely monitored the development of U.S. -Taiwan security relations, as shown by some open source materials. See, for example, 信强「迈向“准军事同盟”：美台安全合作的深化与升级」『美国研究』No.4, 2009. 朱中博「美国“重返亚太”与美台军事关系的发展」, 中国国际问题研究所, February 24, 2014, http://www.ciiis.org.cn/chinese/2014-02/24/content_6691136.htm, accessed on May 9, 2016.

5. Proposing an Informal Mechanism for Japan-Taiwan Unofficial Defense Talks

1) Constraints and obstacles

Japan's purpose will have to be very limited in building unofficial security relationship with Taiwan, when compared and contrast with the U.S. case. Without any security commitment to Taiwan nor any legal basis thereof, Japan shall not facilitate Taiwan's defense reform and military transformation nor exert similar pressure upon it. Nor shall Japan conduct arms sales to Taiwan. It is the U.S. that must bear burden to engage itself in reform and transformation as Taiwan's sole security guarantor: Yet, Japan will possibly face operational needs in the case of a Taiwan contingency, given its alliance relationship with the U.S. that has ambiguous but significant security commitment to Taiwan according to the TRA.

This means that Japan has no need to build a political-strategic dialogue with Taiwan, which is similar to the Monterey Talks, as the matter of high priority. This is because, Japan can ask the U.S., through the SCC and its subordinate organs, of Taiwan's role in U.S. Asia-Pacific security strategy in which the U.S.-Japan alliance plays a central role. As long as the U.S. coordinates two sets of bilateral relation with Japan and Taiwan respectively, there is little need for Japan-Taiwan dialogue at this level. Should the U.S. find a need to do so, Japan can follow U.S. lead to have a de facto trilateral dialogue to be held either in the U.S., including a U.S. base in Japan, or in Japan; Taiwan's officials could participate as observers in a U.S.-Japan dialogue, or Japan's officials in a U.S. -Taiwan dialogue. In fact, in 2006, the head of the AIT in Taipei assumed that "visible trilateral discussions and cooperation [were] not advisable and unnecessarily heightened tensions across the strait", and guessed that the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) recommended the Taiwan military to establish cooperation with Japan.⁵³⁾ This suggests that the State Department was

53) "Director's Introductory Call on Minister of Defense Lee Jye, March 21, 2006", WikiLeaks (06TAIPEI1194_a), April 6, 2006, <https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/>

negative about trilateral cooperation, particularly because it would likely provoke China, while the Department of Defense and the military were rather positive about it. Thus, a window of opportunity may be open for trilateral cooperation if there is little need to be nervous about possible provocation vis-à-vis China, depending on the complicated interplay of international and domestic factors.

Japan-Taiwan defense talks at the operational level would necessarily require sharing common understanding on the U.S. Asia-Pacific security strategy and their militaries' respective roles and missions. If this condition is met, bilateral talks would center exclusively on informal operational coordination. If not, the talks would have to exchange their views on U.S.-Taiwan roles and missions prior to or concurrent with dialogues on Japan-Taiwan operational coordination, while clearly communicating their intent with the U.S. that the talks play supplementary and complementary roles without seeking their own strategic independence of overall U.S. strategy. In this sense, it is highly sensitive to discuss on scenarios in which the U.S. forces are not available in the Taiwan's theater or in which the U.S. forces are unable to intervene on time. Japan and Taiwan, therefore, have to be fully aware of this potential, particularly seen from a U.S. perspective, and control risks in alliance management by excluding such a scenario study, if without impending needs.

Even with the limited purpose, Japan is in thrall to legal constraints resulting from its recognition of the PRC and derecognition of the ROC. Its established legal position is that the Japanese government is barred from entering an official inter-state relationship with the Taiwan's authority and having an official inter-state contact with it, including military-to-military dialogues and exchanges. This inevitably precludes any bilateral defense cooperation with Taiwan, including arms sales. This position makes a sense, at least in principle, in maintaining a good level of stability in the strategically important yet sometimes conflictual relations

06TAIPEI1194_a.html, May 9, 2016.

with the PRC that claims the sovereignty over Taiwan. More specifically, Japan's MOFA restricts the contact of its government personnel with the Taiwanese counterpart, particularly official visit to Taiwan. The restrictions are imposed according to the MOFA Establishment Law Article 4 that empowers it to exclusively manage practical administrative works of the country's diplomatic and other external relations. Evidently, the MOFA has issued an internal ordinance, though kept confidential, which imposes government-wide control on the contact and visit. The control over visit was somewhat loosed, perhaps in 2006, raising the upper limit in rank of officials from a director (課長) to a director-general (局長) of a ministry.⁵⁴⁾

Despite these restrictions, however, it is feasible in theory to have Japan-Taiwan defense-related dialogues and exchanges outside official government channels, as long as they are necessary to maintain regional peace and security in general non-governmental bilateral exchanges in particular ; and as long as they remain non-governmental, informal and unofficial contacts and activities between private citizens or groups of individuals, who are non-state actors. Of course, government officials as individuals can partake in these activities under such a non-governmental framework. The chance is not necessarily slim given the precedent of a U.S. institutional innovation centered on the Monterey Talks process, which has evolved out under similar, if not identical, legal constraints.

54) On November 22, 2002, the then-Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs publicly acknowledged that the upper limit was a Director of a Ministry in the deliberation of the House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs. See, 衆議院外務委員会議事録、155th session, p.3, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/155/0005/15511220005007.pdf>, accessed on May 10, 2006. A MOFA press secretary stated that the control was to be loosed flexibly. See, 外務省報道官会見記録、September 13, 2016, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/hodokan/hodo0609.html#2-A>, accessed on May 10, 2016. In 2015, A director-general of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries paid an official visit to the ROC Food and Drug Administration in Taipei, (Y's Consulting Group). See, 「日本が台湾をWTO提訴か、食品の輸入規制問題」 *Economic News*, April 27, 2015, <https://www.ys-consulting.com.tw/news/56655.html>, accessed on May 10, 2016.

What obstructs Japan's breakthrough lies in a political factor, more specifically, the dynamics inherent in different government structures that have led Japan and the U.S. to take different approaches to building their respective non-governmental bilateral relationship with Taiwan; Japan has an executive-dominated government involving wide administrative discretion in dealing with foreign affairs, which gives the MOFA a privileged position of power and influence in managing the relations with Taiwan. This is in marked contrast to the U.S. law-dominated government under the blunt separation of powers.

No wonder that the MOFA will most likely oppose any policy efforts to build an informal mechanism of bilateral defense talks and exchanges with Taiwan as an intolerable challenge against its exclusive gate-keeping role in Japan-Taiwan relations. In fact, the MOFA has track record in obstructing new defense-related initiatives unfavorable to the privileged position in diplomacy. This is demonstrated well by a fabricated political scandal in 2008 as related to a major defense acquisition bribery case, which obviously targeted those legislators of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in coordination with the Minister of Defense (MOD), who took strong continuous initiatives to achieving the introduction of ballistic missile defense system and the conclusion of the U.S.-Japan General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) of 2007 that later led to the enactment of the Secrets Protection Law of 2013.⁵⁵⁾ The

55) In particular, the circumstances as related to the conclusion of the GSOMIA are revealing.

Despite the conflict of the abovementioned bureaucratic interests, the GSOMIA of 2007 was made possible by strong initiatives of the ruling LDP, especially the defense policy caucus, known as Kokubo-Zoku, consisting of the first Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma, former Defense Agency's Director-Generals and other ranking LDP legislators specializing in national security. The Kokubo-Zoku relied on the National Security Research Group (NSRG) and the U.S.-Japan Center for Peace and Cultural Exchange (CPCE) to lay almost all the necessary intellectual and organizational groundwork prior to intra-LDP policy review, Diet committee level deliberation, and Cabinet's formal decision to conclude the agreement. NSRG is a nonpartisan political organization of legislators, while CPCE is a policy advocacy non-profit

achievements enhanced the power and influence of the MOD and the SDF in Japan's security policy making, at the expense of those of the MOFA. The underlying dynamics can be only comprehended by Japan's bureaucratic politics in the historical context after the post-war U.S. military occupation of Japan.

Needless to say, today's pacifist Japanese state is a product of the U.S. post-war occupation. Unlike post-war occupied Germany, U.S. ruled occupied Japan indirectly through the existing Japanese bureaucracy. Given the historical legacy of its strong state versus weak society, the bureaucracy has continued basically intact and preserved its *de facto*, if not *de jure*, predominance in policy making in the existing system of parliamentary democracy. The post-war bureaucracy has worked assiduously to prevent the reemergence of the military as an institutional

organization whose members include academics and practitioners knowledgeable about security affairs. (CPCE has been renamed as Center for International Strategic Studies [CISS].)

The Office of Prosecutors punched a counterblow against NSRG and CPCE after the conclusion of the GSOMIA, which forced them dormant until recently. Naoki Akiyama, executive director of these organizations, was arrested and convicted on a charge of tax evasion for his non-profit activities in the U.S., while embroiled in a separate defense acquisition scandal centered on a case of bribery and corruption by a defense trade firm and then-Administrative Vice-Minister of Defense Takemasa Moriya. Akiyama played a central role in organizing major defense policy discussions among legislators, bureaucrats, and industrialists, including one on the acquisition of Japan's missile defense system. In particular, through such non-profit activities, he served as the behind-the-scenes fixer who promoted the conclusion of the GSOMIA, which the Prosecutors probably saw challenged their privileged position in law. As the result, they suspected him, without a clear proof, as the first step to reach a greater defense acquisition scandal involving the LDP defense tribe and industrialists. The Akiyama's case suggests a case of the use of judicial system to advance bureaucratic interests. (See, 秋山直紀『防衛疑惑』講談社, 2008. Also, see the webpages of the Congressional National Security Research Group (NSRG) and the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), <http://www.ja-nsrg.or.jp/>, <http://www.ci-ss.jp/Performance.html>, accessed on May 11, 2016.)

Masahiro Matsumura, "Deepening Japan's Information Security Regime", *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

competitor, reflecting the collective memory of the prewar military dictatorship. Today, within the bureaucracy, the MOFA, not the MOD, has consistently served as the primary organ for national security policy making. This has resulted from Japan's unique historical path that the MOFA served as the sole contact with the U.S.-dominated occupation authority. Even after the restoration of sovereignty in 1952, Japan continued its security reliance on the alliance with the U.S. in which the MOFA served as the alliance manager, while the Defense Agency solely managed the SDF; the Agency was not a policy-making organ. While the Defense Agency was elevated to ministerial status in 2007, the MOD is still in the process of becoming a first-tier policy-making organ. MOD bureaucrats and SDF leadership remain challenged by a lack of human resources and the Ministry's own organizational structure as embedded in laws, regulations and practices under the pacifist constitution that the U.S. imposed on occupied Japan.⁵⁶⁾

Hence, it is essential to evade the above dynamics of bureaucratic politics against building an informal mechanism of Japan-Taiwan defense dialogues, with a focus on how to cope with possible obstruction and sabotage of the government-wide alignment of high-ranking bureaucrats centered on the MOFA.

2) Devising an informal bilateral approach to evade possible obstruction and sabotage

Given the structural differences of the U.S. and the Japan's governments, there will not be broad Japanese support for Japan-Taiwan informal defense talks and exchanges, but only narrow but entrenched support of political leaders and policy makers in national security in the context of broad and unfocused support of the general public for strengthening friendlier bilateral relations. This is in sharp contrast to the unflinching presence of U.S. "Blue Team", or "the dense and broad networks of China alarmists including members of Congress, congressional staff, think tank

56) *Ibid*, pp. 8–9.

fellows, Republican political operatives, conservative journalists, lobbyists for Taiwan, former intelligence officers, and a handful of academics”, who support strengthening U.S.-Taiwan security cooperation in general and building the Monterey Talks processes in particular.⁵⁷⁾

True, Japan has visible Taiwan lobbies with conservative political and opinion leaders at the core. Also, there are some pro-Taiwan all-party parliamentary leagues consisting of legislators actively engaged in promotion of non-governmental bilateral relations, with an implicit agenda on strengthening security relations with Taiwan. The biggest and oldest one, *Nikka Giin Kondankai* (日華議員懇談会) had 284 members as of March 2014.⁵⁸⁾ In April 2006, some 30 LDP back-benchers formed another one, headed by Nobuo Kishi, young brother of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. It vainly advocated legislation of a Japan’s equivalent of the TRA.⁵⁹⁾ Due to the established position of the MOFA-led state policy, however, these lobbies and leagues have consistently failed to make any significant progress in strengthening security relations with Taiwan, while having indirectly yet greatly influenced Japan’s overall China policy making.⁶⁰⁾ As long as bilateral security issues are concerned, the parliamentary-league approach will at best make significant difference in high-profile exchange and at worst only inflate expectation on both sides, inviting all the more persistent MOFA’s obstruction. Similarly, Taiwan’s high-profile approach will also be counter-productive.⁶¹⁾

Thus, the initiatives and negotiation toward informal Japan-Taiwan

57) Pillsbury, “U.S. Debates About Taiwan’s Security, 1979–2009”, *op. cit.*, pp. 216.

58) 「日華議員懇談会」、ウィキペディア、<https://ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/日華議員懇談会>, accessed on May 11, 2016. 王海濱·蔡亮「试析“日华恳”及其对中日关系的影响」『日本文学刊』No.5, 2009, <http://qk.cass.cn/rbxk/qkml/2009year/5/200909/P020140326511327170443.pdf>, accessed on May 11, 2016.

59) 林賢參, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

60) 王海濱「日本国会亲台议员与日本对华决策」『现代国际关系』No. 12, 2010. 王海濱·蔡亮, *op. cit.*

61) In response to the second Guidelines of 1997 and the subsequent Japan’s Law on Emergencies in Area Surrounding Japan that implicitly assume a Taiwan Strait contingency, Taiwan set up in 2011 the Japan Working Group, now known as the Board on Taiwan-Japan Relations, under the Presidential Office.

defense interaction as well as, once set, its operation all have to proceed utterly through non-governmental, unofficial and informal contacts and channels, only with Japanese and Taiwanese political leaders and public intellectuals in defense/military policies, including defense policy makers and military leaders partaking in the process in their own individual capacity. As a matter of course, this approach precludes any involvement of the two MOFAs in Tokyo and Taipei in general and any use of the established non-governmental channels between the Interexchange Association and the CCNAA/TERCO in particular. These conditions must be strictly observed until the mechanism-building process reaches at an irreversible phase in which the Japanese and the U.S. political circles accept or at least acquiesce the mechanism

The approach, then, will necessarily make active use of non-profit private actors such as universities and think tanks. In this light, the Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project at the Social Science Research Council in New York is an exemplar, given that it has brought since 1995 representatives together from the U.S. and the five regional countries concerned, including North Korea with which the U.S. has no diplomatic relations but merely maintains a protracted truce, involving being legally in the state of war; they have been able to discuss how to

In 2005, Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the Committee on Japanese Affairs in addition to the AEAR, a non-governmental agency of Taiwan to handle the matters concerning the interests of Taiwan and Japan.

At the political level, in 2006, Taiwan sent to Japan General Hu Chen-Pu, director of the Political Warfare Bureau of Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense to study the new developments after the second Guidelines. In the same year, the then-ruling Democratic Progressive Party published "the Proposition on Taiwan's Relations with Japan", followed by Taiwan's delegation to Japan that included Presidential Office Secretary-General Mark Chen, DPP Chair Yu Shyi-Kun, and former head of the DPP Department of International Affairs Hsiao Bi-Khim. On the side of the then-opposition Chinese National Party (KMT), the President of the Legislative Yuan Wang Jin-Pyng and then-KMT Chair Ma Ying-Jeou also visited Japan. See, Kuo-wen Kuo and Hsiang-yi Yeh, "The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Asia-Pacific Security Implications for Japan-Taiwan Relations", *JEBAT: Malaysian Journal of History, Politics & Strategic Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 1, 2015, pp. 70-71.

end North Korea's nuclear and missile programs in an unofficial capacity made possible under the umbrella of academic and intellectual exchanges.⁶²⁾ The approach is all the more appropriate in Japan-Taiwan relations.

Unfortunately, due to the drastic difference of U.S. and Japanese social-political cultures, few Japanese universities have ever played and will likely play an active role in non-governmental defense/military policy-oriented talks with foreign individuals, especially those from countries and areas that require special political, legal, and other considerations. Similarly, Japanese think tanks do not suit the role due to the lack of genuine financial and organizational independence. Japan's non-profit sectors suffer grave funding difficulty given the very weak philanthropic tradition under the longtime administrative state from the early 17th century. Many large ones take the form of stock corporation that remains linked or affiliated with a bank, securities firm, or financial firm, having evolved from its analysis department. Needless to say, they are for-profit organizations. While the National Institute for Defense Studies, the primary in-house think tank of the MOD, cannot by definition engage itself in non-governmental activities, other ranking think tanks are closely linked or even directly controlled in budget and/or staff by central bureaucracies, especially the MOFA and the MOD. They include the Japan Institute of International Relations, the Japan Forum on International Relations, the Japan Center for International Exchange, the Institute for International Policy Studies, and the Research Institute for Peace and Security, among others. The Tokyo Foundation and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation are unsuitable for a low-profile approach toward mechanism-building and policy transformation, because both of them focus on networking of academics and public intellectuals and the extensive public outreach of their research products and policy proposals.

This effectively leaves out only the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) or a new platform to be created with CISS's assistance,

62) "Northeast Asia Cooperative Security Project: Contributing to conflict resolution in Northeast Asia (Overview)", <http://www.ssrc.org/programs/view/northeast-asia-cooperative-security-project/>, accessed on May 12, 2016.

given its human resources and policy network of Japanese political leaders, policy makers and public intellectuals in defense/military policy with unparalleled track record in Japan's defense policy transformation.

3) Developing a policy package for sequential execution

At outset, the Taiwan side will have to organize an informal working group within the National Security Council of the Office of the President or the Ministry of Defense. The group shall pay necessary expenses to hold a series of meetings in Tokyo. This is because a Japanese non-profit organization is not easily able to cover such expenses to visit Taipei, given the sluggish level of philanthropic activities in Japan in general and the narrow societal support for funding the bilateral informal defense policy exchanges in particular. Also, this is because high ranking Japanese defense officials are prohibited to make an official visit to Taiwan. Taiwanese officials perhaps should not use their official passports for low-profile visit, in order not to unnecessarily irritate Japan's MOFA, while they must neither notify the TECRO in Tokyo nor Taiwan's MOFA. Sending a delegation to Tokyo would be significantly easier than the Monterey Talks, given the geographic proximity between Japan and Taiwan.

On the first stage, Taiwanese officials will have to make initial direct contact with the CISS and pay visits to Tokyo for a series of private discussions on common interests in an informal mechanism for bilateral defense policy exchanges. The ground work will be only made possible with a joint working group consisting of the CISS public intellectuals and Taiwanese officials by sharing conceptual premises and theoretical perspectives thereof. With the groundwork so solidified, the following step will be to bring together the core members of political leaders on both sides in Tokyo and, with a summary report of the working group, confirm their joint commitment to building the mechanism and then to task the group to formulate an initial roadmap for defense policy talks that include Japanese policy making and planning officials.

On the second stage, the working group will plan and execute a series of seminars, while setting specific agendas involving selection of appropriate Japanese defense policy makers and planners who are willing to participate therein in their own individual capacity. An initial agenda has to put focus on basic important defense and military issues, not on strategic ones that have to be largely avoided in consideration of possible repercussion on the U.S.-Japan alliance. Strategic issues will be freely discussed in the working group in which no Japanese officials are included. Also, initial seminars will include Japanese official at the rank of a director of the MOD, and gradually widen the scope and range of issues to be discussed. After several seminars, their synergy will naturally take place, which will enable comprehensive discussion of defense policy, short of national security policy, with participants with the rank of a director-general of the MOD together with their Taiwanese counterparts.

On the third stage, possibly in tandem with the second stage, the working group will plan and implement a series of specialized workshops, while setting specific agendas involving selection of proper SDF leaders who are willing to participate therein in their own individual capacity. The focus needs to be put on interoperability issues in military communications, electronic connectivity, and operational/tactical formation sharing. Planning the workshops by the working group will demand inclusion therein of retired SDF leaders, perhaps former general and/or flag officers, and their Taiwanese counterparts. Unlike the discussion on the second stage, these workshops on military policy and issues will have to begin with participation of SDF leaders with higher-ranks and eventually proceed to those with the rank of operator.

With cumulative synergy of the three stages that are to be kept low-profile, the fourth stage will have to surface the mechanism into the public eyes as a substantial institutional innovation in Japan-Taiwan informal defense and military policy talks. The talks, then, may be incorporated into or at least linked organically with the established non-governmental mechanism for bilateral relations. To do this, it is essential to secure not only the broad support of Japanese political circles but also U.S.

acceptance or at least acquiescence. This requires accumulating fait accompli without disrupting Sino-Japan relations.

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この「研究叢書」は、所員の推進する学際的共同研究および個人研究の成果を継続的に刊行することにより、もって、新たな文化の創造と学術の進歩に寄与しようとするものである。

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Exploring Unofficial Japan-Taiwan Security Policy
Coordination After The New Guidelines
For Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation

研究叢書 31

2017年3月13日 発行

著者	松村昌廣
発行者	桃山学院大学総合研究所
[594-1198]	大阪府和泉市まなび野1-1 TEL(0725)54-3131(代)
印刷所	東洋紙業高速印刷株式会社
[556-0029]	大阪市浪速区芦原2-5-56 TEL(06)6567-0511(代)
